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Toward an Ideal WTO Safeguards RegimeLessons from U.S.-Steel
YOUNGJIN JUNG* AND ELLEN JOOYEON KANG**

"W1f the standardsof obtaining import-relatedremedies are too restrictive, the escape clause mechanism
cannot serve as an effective shock absorberfor protectionistpressures.On the other hand,if the eligibility
criteria are too weak, any domestic indutry that faces import competition may become eligible for
1
temporary protection.

I. Introduction
On November 10, 2003, the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
ruled definitively that the safeguard measures imposed by the United States on a wide range
of steel imports constituted a violation of Article XIX of the 1994 General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the WTO Agreement on Safeguards (SG Agreement).' This
ruling was rendered in the wake of relentless condemnations by an alarmed international
community against the U.S. safeguard measure as the most dramatically protectionist step
in decades.' Countries expressed grave concerns that the U.S. safeguard measure would
fatally undermine the integrity of and confidence in the global trading order under the
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4
auspices of the WTO.
Contingent upon the United States' withdrawal of the measure, the
European Union (EU), among other co-complainants, was poised to impose immediate
retaliatory duties on $2.2 billion of American products ranging from motorboats to orange
juice.5 On the domestic front, criticisms were hurled, with lesser intensity, at the Bush
administration that the measure inflicted far-reaching damage on U.S. steel-using businesses, not to mention on the credibility and morality of the United States as a leader of
6
the global initiative for trade-liberalization.
Broadly speaking, the Bush administration received extensive criticism criticized for putting a specific domestic industry's concerns ahead of international free-trade obligations.
Against such unprecedented criticisms in both the international and domestic arenas alike,
on December 4, 2003-twenty months after imposing the tariffs-President Bush's fight
eventually came to an end following an announcement that the controversial safeguard
measure would be dismanded.' Yet, the Bush administration never ceased to vindicate its
claim that the U.S. steel industry essentially confronted a serious crisis capable of damaging
the groundwork of the industry as a whole, primarily due to a sharp increase in imports.
In turn, the administration could not ignore its state responsibility to render import relief
to an industry that would have collapsed without it.'
The tremendous controversy surrounding the U.S.-Steel case over the past months provides a golden opportunity to reassess the general disciplines of the safeguards institutions
as a whole. The thrust of this paper is to examine whether the present VVTO Agreement
governing the safeguards regime is appropriately catering to the needs of national governments to cushion unexpected economic disruptions in the course of pursuing trade liberalization, as envisioned by the framers of the global trading order in the post-war period.
This analysis is made against mounting criticisms that some dimensions of the safeguards
discipline under the auspices of the WTO are more stringent than necessary for governments to effectively stave off domestic crises that could negatively affect the global trade
liberalization initiative. More concretely, the two cardinal principles of the SG Agreement-the non-discrimination principle and compensation-in tandem with legal interpretations by the Appellate Body of several VVTO Agreement provisions are the cases in
point.
To this end, section II first explores the implications behind the recent steel debate and
whether a rethinking of some of the fundamental principles underlying the safeguards re-

4. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Angry Europeans to Challenge U.S.-Steel Tariffi at WTO., N.Y TIMES, Mar.
6, 2002, atPI2;JapanSays U.S.-Steel Decision 'Regrettable',INSIDE U.S. TADE,Mar. 6, 2002;AustraliaConsidering
Possible WTO Steel Case, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Mar. 6, 2002; New Zealand Critical of Steel Tariff, ISsmE U.S.
TRA.DE, Mar. 6, 2002; India Says U.S.-Steel Tariffi Could Impact New Round Of WTO Negotiations, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Mar. 7, 2002.
5. Its choice of targets is designed partly to serve Europe's own domestic interests by avoiding areas where
it relies on American produce and, secondly, to hurt producers in ways likely to do maximum damage to
President Bush in the following presidential election. See Hard Decisions,EcoNoMIsT, Nov. 15, 2003 [hereinafter
Hard Decisions].
6. See, e.g., CITAC Chairman:Steel UsersAngered By Section 201 Outcome; New Tax on American Manufacturing
Companies Will Cost Jobs, PR NEWSwIRE, Mar. 5, 2002; Press Release, Consuming Industries Trade Action
Coalition Steel Task Force (CITA STF) CITAC STF World Trade OrganizationRuling Adds Urgency to Steel
Consumer's Pleafor President Bush to Terminate the Steel Tariff Now, Nov. 10, 2003, availableat http://www.
citac.info/steeltaskforce/releases/2003/11 _10.php.
7. See The White House, President's Statement on Steel, (Dec. 4, 2003), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/release/2003/12/20031204-5.html.
8. Id.
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gime is necessary. Then, it examines the source of the controversy over the U.S. safeguard
measure on imported steel, the significance of the U.S. steel industry and the economic
difficulties that the industry recently appeared to experience. Notwithstanding the outright
criticisms of the measure, this paper argues that the steel crisis may have, in fact, given the
U.S. government justification to resort to some type of trade remedy-including the safeguards remedy-to temporarily protect its industry and allow it to adjust to international
competition. Section III examines the argument's validity by briefly tracing the historical

9
foundation of the safeguards measure or the "escape clause," the "embedded liberalism"
bargain, and the overriding objective of why the safeguards regime was assimilated into the
international trading system in the first place. Coming on the heels of an examination of
the surfacing problems of the safeguards discipline, section IV walks through the fundamental structure and core principles of the safeguards institutions to assess whether they
should be revisited to reflect the changed realities of the political and economic ambiance

enfolding the regime. It also explores the long controversial standard-of-review issue within
the Appellate Body to assess whether the newly crafted standards are too restrictive and, in
turn, argues that the standards should be relaxed to the extent that national governments
can lawfully resort to the safeguards remedy in dealing with serious economic difficulties
in the course of continuously opening their markets. Finally, section V makes tentative
conclusions and provides several recommendations to the international community for the
continuance of a successful, thriving global market economy.

H. Background: Romancing Big Steel' 0
Stoking the fires of an unparalleled global steel trade war, President Bush announced in
March 2002 that a safeguard measure in the form of tariffs ranging from 8 to 30 percent
and tariff rate quotas would be imposed on ten steel product categories for a period of three
years." Exceptions were carved out for a range of developing nations and Free Trade Agreement (FTA) partners, including Mexico and Canada.
The United States imposed the measures with the apparent purpose of providing "breath2
ing room" to the ailing U.S. steel industry so that it would be able to carry out full-scale
adjustments to get back on its feet. In response to the incessant complaints from the U.S.
steel industry that lower priced and subsidized steel imports were causing serious injury to
the domestic steel industry, the U.S. Trade Representative's Office (USTR) requested that
in June 2001 the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) initiate an investigation
under section 201 of the 1974 Trade Act" on certain steel products. Products covered by
the investigation were divided into four broad categories: carbon and alloy flat products,
carbon and alloy long products, carbon and alloy tubular products, and stainless and tool

9. The term was coined by John Ruggie. SeeJohn G. Ruggie, InternationalRegimes, Transactionsand Cbang,
Embedded Liberalism in the Post War Economic Order, 36 379,393 (1982) [hereinafter Ruggie].
10. See Romancing Big Steel, ECONOMIST, Feb. 14, 2002 (borrowing the phrase "Romancing Big Steel").
11. Proclamation No. 7529, 67 Fed. Reg. 10,553 (Mar. 5, 2002). The eight steel products include certain
carbon flat-rolled steel, hot-rolled bar, cold-finished bar, rebar, certain tubular products, carbon and alloy
fittings, stainless steel bar, and stainless steel rod.
12. Paul Magnusson, & Arndt, Michael, Behind the Steel-Tariff Curtain, Bus. WR., Mar. 8, 2002, at http:!!
www.businessweek.comlbwdaily/dnflash/mar2002/nf2002038-1478.htm.
13. 19 U.S.C. 2251 (2004). See Trade Act of 1914, 19 U.S.C. 2251-2254 (regarding domestic procedures of
investigations of injury to American industries caused by increased imports).
WINTER 2004

922

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

steel products.14 They were further subdivided into thirty-three subcategories. 5 To date,
the case was the largest and most complex safeguard investigation ever carried out by the
USITC.
The safeguard measure instantly sparked a proliferation of trade protectionism around
the globe as the EU and China 6 hastily adopted provisional safeguard measures under
article 6 of the SG Agreement 7 to thwart steel imports being diverted into their markets
from the U.S.' s At the same time, the EU, followed by Japan, Korea, Norway, China,
Switzerland, New Zealand, and Brazil challenged the U.S. safeguard measure before the
WTO. 9 Moreover, China, in concert with the EU, Japan, and Norway took the step as
provided for under article 8 of the SG Agreement and notified the WTO Council for Trade
in Goods (CTG) of its intention to suspend concessions against the United States. Justifiable or not, the U.S. safeguard measure set off a protectionist "race to the bottom," undermining both the interstate bond of trust and the spirit of free trade underpinning the
international trading regime.
The ensuing mayhem in the global trade of steel begs the question of how significantly
the Bush administration viewed the U.S. steel industry to impose emergency protection
14. See Press Release, U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC), ITC Details Its Determinations Concerning Impact of Imports of Steel on U.S. Industry, Oct. 23, 2001, available athttp://www.usitc.gov.
15. Id. To collect data, the ITC divided steel imports into 33 product categories: seven classes of carbon and
alloy flat products; ten carbon and alloy long products; five carbon and alloy tubular products; and 11 stainless
and tool steel products. From these 33 'product sub-categories', the ITC defined 27 separate 'domestic industries' made up of: three domestic industries producing carbon and alloy products, ten domestic industries
producing carbon and alloy long products, four domestic industries producing carbon and alloy pipe and rube,
and ten domestic industries producing stainless steel products.
16. See, U.S.-Steel, Notifications to the WTO Committee on Safeguards, G/SG/N/6/EEC/1-G/SG/N/7/
EEC/-G/SG/N/ll/EEC/1 (Apr. 2, 2002) G/SG/N/6/CHN/I, G/SG/N/7/CHN/l, G/SG/N/ll/CHN/l,
(May 23, 2002) (by China).
17. Agreement on Safeguards, World Trade Organization, Art. 6, available athttp://www.wto.org [hereinafter SG Agreement]. Article 6 provides in part: "In critical circumstances where delay would cause damage
which it would be difficult to repair, a Member may take a provisional safeguard measure pursuant to a preliminary determination that there is clear evidence that increased imports have caused or are threatening to cause
serious injury."
18. See Press Release, European Union (EU), EU Adopts Temporary Measures to Guard Against Floods of
Steel Imports Resulting from U.S. Protectionism Mar. 27, 2002, available atwww.wto.org. See alrso, Youngjin
Jung, Cbina's Aggressive Legalism: Cbina's FirrtSafeguard Measure, 36 J. WORLD TRsADE
1037 (2002) (providing
an overview of the Chinese provisional safeguard measure).
19. Several countries challenged the U.S. policy on steel imports under article 6.2 of the VTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU). See U.S.-Steel, Request for the Establishment of a Panel, WT/DS248/12
(May 8, 2002) (by the European Communities on May 7, 2002), WT/DS249/6 (May 21, 2002) (by Japan on
May 21, 2002), WT/DS251/7 (May 24, 2002) (by Korea on May 21, 2002), WT/DS252/5 (May 27, 2002) (by
China on May 27, 2002), WT/DS253/5 (June 4, 2002) by Switzerland on Jun. 3, 2002), WT/DS254/5 (Jun.
4, 2002) (by Norway on June 3, 2002), WT/DS258/9 (June 28, 2002) (by New Zealand on Jun. 27, 2002),
WT/DS259/10 (July 22, 2002) (by Brazil on July 18, 2002). A single Panel was established for the U.S. steel
safeguard pursuant to article 9.1 of the DSU. See U.S.-Steel, Procedural Agreement between the United States
and China, the European Communities, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland, WFT/DS248/
13, WT/DS249/7, WT/DS251/8, VVT/DS252/6, WT/DS253/6, WT/DS254/6, WTIDS258/10 (July 22,
2002); Procedural Agreement between the United States and Brazil, WT/DS259/9 (July 23, 2002). The Panel
ruled that the U.S. safeguard measure violated the SG Agreement and GATT and requested the measure to
be brought into conformity with the VTO Agreement. The United States notified its intent of appeal on
August 11, 2003. See U.S.-Steel, Notification of an Appeal by the United States, WT/DS248/17, WT/DS249/
11, WT/DS251/12, VW7T/DS252/10, WT/DS253/10, WT/DS254/10, WT/DS258/14, VWTIDS259/13 (Aug.
14, 2003). The Appellate Body rendered its final rulings on November 10, 2003. See U.S.-Steel, supra note 2.
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defying vehement calls from both the international and domestic fronts that the measure
was a primafacie violation of W/TO rules.
Steel has been the backbone of dynamic economies around the globe, and the United
States is no exception; the growth of the U.S. steel industry was integral to the rise of the
United States' economic power. Needless to say, the U.S. steel industry makes a sizeable
contribution to the U.S. economy. Steel can be found in all facets of economic life including
energy, transportation, health and public safety, construction, and more. The carbon and
alloy steel producing industry in the United States, for instance, employs about 115,000
20
workers and manufactures over $50 billion worth of steel products on an annual basis.
The U.S. specialty steel industry employs around 25,000 workers and produces $8 billion
2
worth of high-technology, stainless, and other special alloy products annually. 1 If the U.S.
steel industry ever collapses, the entire supply chain of U.S. companies and industries that
are suppliers to. and buyers of the U.S. steel industry would be critically affected. In short,
the engines of the U.S. economy would falter if basic industries such as steel go under.
Apart from the economic impact, there are also legitimate, strongly voiced national se22
curity concerns about the United States becoming overly dependant upon steel imports.
These concerns increased in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001,
which sharply raised national awareness that infrastructure and installations should be reinforced, and that a strong and viable domestic steel industry is vital to provide immediate
steel deliveries when required. Steel can be encountered in virtually every military platform,
23
from nuclear aircraft carriers to missile systems. U.S. steel companies and the U.S. Department of Defense joined in research that led to breakthroughs in steel technology for
military and commercial applications.2 4 Potential difficulties can arise in maintaining and
rebuilding infrastructure where the nation is largely dependent upon offshore sources for
steel.
Although the U.S. steel industry underwent intermittent difficulties over the past decades,
significant indications of a full-fledged steel crisis began to reemerge in 1998.25 From 1998
26
to 2001, twenty-three U.S. steel companies filed for bankruptcy. For instance, in December 2000, America's third largest steel producer, LTV, went bankrupt, and Bethlehem Steel,
the second largest, went bankrupt as well in October 2001.27 In addition, during the same
2s
period more than 25,000 steel workers lost jobs, and steel prices remained at or below

20. American Iron and Steel Institute, Specialty Steel Industry of North America, Steel Manufacturers
Association, United Steelworkers of America, A Strong U.S. Steel Industry: Critical to National Defense and
Economic Security, at 2 (Dec. 2001), available at http://www.steel.org/news/pr/2001/images/FINALNatSec
Paper.pdf [hereinafter American Iron and Steel Institute].
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 4-5.
25. See generally Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Ben Goodrich, Steel: Big Problems, Better Solutions, Policy Brief
01-9, Institute for International Economics (July, 2001), availableat http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pbOl-9.
hmu (describing the history of steel crises in the U.S.) [hereinafter Hufbauer & Goodrich].
26. American Iron and Steel Institute, supra note 20, at 23.
27. Smeltdown, EcoNoMIsT, Oct. 18, 2001.
28. American Iron and Steel Institute, supra note 20. In the second quarter of 2001, about 142,000 people
were employed in the steel industry, down from 163,000 in 1997. In 1974, employment was 521,000.
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their mid-2000 levels, the historical average.2 9 Capacity utilization of steel producers dropped
from 90 percent in early 1998 to 75 percent by year's end.3 ° By the first half of 2001, 50

percent of U.S. steel companies reported operating losses."
Calling it the most serious crisis32 for the U.S. steel industry since the 1980s, industry
leaders and Congress called for action. To address their concerns, onJune 5,2001, President
Bush announced a comprehensive, multi-pronged initiative to confront the challenges facing the U.S. steel industry.33 He directed the USTR to initiate conversations with trading
partners to negotiate rules governing steel trade, eliminate inefficient steel capacity worldwide, and eliminate market distorting government subsidies.3 4 The President also instructed
the USTR to investigate injurious consequences on the U.S. steel industry under section
201 of the Trade Act of 1974,11 eventually resulting in the imposition of the controversial
safeguard remedy.
Critics assert that instead of relying on economics, President Bush merely acted on political motives to secure the electoral edge for the Republican candidates in America's steelproducing heartland 6 when deciding to impose the safeguard measure, ignoring the risk
of a simmering global trade war and raising prices of U.S. consumer goods. Skeptics of the
measure also contend that the price tag for abandoning free-trade principles for political
expediency is too high. But, considering the great significance of steel to both the U.S.
economy and homeland security, it may have been impracticable for the Bush Administration to ignore the fervent cries for relief from the troubled U.S. steel industry.
Of course, the administration had a variety of other options available, such as improving
the trade adjustment assistance programs for workers, assisting the unemployed in searching
for new jobs, or putting a full force focus on multi-lateral talks to cut down the global
oversupply of steel.3 7 Nevertheless, the scope of this paper does not attempt to prioritize
or cover those other options. Instead, it simply asserts that given the critical circumstances
enveloping the U.S. steel industry, the safeguard measure was a viable remedy accessible to
the United States, and, therefore, the U.S. action did not warrant such intense and diverse
criticisms.

29. U.S.
LUTIONS

DEP'T COM., INT'L

TRADE ASS'N,

GLOBAL STEEL TRADE: STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS AND FUTURE So-

(July 2000), available at hnp://www.ita.doc.gov/media/steelreport726.html. [hereinafter

STEEL TRADE

REPORT].

30. Id. at 1.
31. Id.
32. SG Agreement, supra note 17, art. 4.2(a) (stipulating that in order to assess whether the domestic industry
is undergoing serious injury or threat thereof, "[T]he competent authorities shall evaluate all relevant factors
of an objective and quantifiable nature having a beating on the situation of that industry, in particular, the rate
and amount of the increase in imports of the product concerned in absolute terms, the share of the domestic

market taken by increased imports, changes in the level of sales, production, productivity; capacity utilization,
profits and losses, and employment.)."

33. Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President Regarding a Multilateral Initiative on
Steel (June 5, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/200l/06/print/200l0605-4.htnl
(on file with the White House).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Hard Decisions, supra note 5 (defining the heartland as West Virginia, Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, and
Pennsylvania).
37. STEEL TRADE REPORT, supra note 29 (detailing varying alternatives President Bush could have resorted
to apart from Section 201).
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Furthermore, it is difficult to evade denunciations that the U.S. integrated steel com3
panies received various forms of government protection for more than three decades. " In
protection
lieu of encouraging the industry to restructure, critics claim that long-term
sustained the existence of inefficient companies at a high cost to U.S. consumers. Such
allegations, though reasonable in some dimensions, nevertheless, appear to be oblivious to
the fact that the industry underwent some restructuring in the 1980s and 1990s, allowing
39
and both the
it to regain some competitiveness. Productivity increased 300 percent,40
41
prices and the demand for steel were high in the first half of 1998.
Some critics argue that the persistent overcapacity in the global steel industry, abetted
by widespread market distortions and high costs of the U.S. steel industry, namely the
"legacy liabilities" in health-care and pension benefits, are to blame for the turmoil within
the U.S. steel industry.42 Conversely, many contend that the fundamental reason that the
U.S. steel industry was reeling in red ink from the latter half of 1998 is easily attributed to
increased imports. They assert that the Asian and Russian financial crises in late 1997 were
43
mostly to blame for the record amounts of imports flooding into the U.S. market. It is
noteworthy that the decline in the U.S. steel industry in 1998 coincides with the record
amounts of imports that flooded into the U.S. market. In June 1998 alone, 3.7 million tons
of steel was imported to the United States, approximately 40 percent more than the previous
year.- U.S. producers forcefully argued that imports were causing the domestic prices to
plummet.4 Excluding certain products such as hot-rolled bar or stainless steel rod, the
WTO Panel and Appellate Body acknowledged that imports of many of the steel products
increased compared to previous years. 4Some critics also claim that the U.S. safeguard measure was merely a disguise to erect
protectionist measures against steel imports. If adjustment was truly the raison d'etre for
safeguard actions, then it aptly follows that the U.S. government should have demanded an
effective adjustment program from the industry and subsequently tailored public policies
to encourage such adjustment. In this sense, it would also be instructive to examine whether
the U.S. steel industry carried out some form of adjustment during the period of safeguard
invocation, or whether, as most trade experts argue, the industry merely waddled in content
with the temporary protection provided by the safeguard action.

38. Hufbauer & Goodrich, supra note 25 (illustrating the protectionist tradition dates back to 1969 when
President Nixon forced Japan and Europe to accept so-called voluntary export restraints to avoid formal U.S.
quotas).
39. STEEL TRADE REPORT, supra note 29, at 6.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Hufbauer & Goodrich, supra note 25 (stating the average annual burden of legacy costs for an integrated
steel company has been approximately $1 billion).
43. STEEL TRADE REPORT, supra note 29 (finding that the Asian financial crisis led to deep recessions in several
countries, such as Korea, and consumption of steel plummeted in Asia. Eventually, increasing quantities of steel
were diverted to the remaining healthy markets such as the U.S. Given the relatively open American market
and continuing high demand for steel, some industry experts argue that foreign-produced steel increased in
the U.S.).
44. Peter Galuszka, Big Steel. Antidumping Suits vs. Rising Asian Imports,? Bus. WK., Sept. 9, 1998, available
at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/sep1998/nfS909a.htm.
45. Id.; see also Hufbauer & Goodrich, supra note 25 (finding for instance, imported hot-rolled steel was
selling at $220 a ton while domestic steel stood at S315).
46. U.S.-Steel, supra note 2, para. 513.
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Since the tariffs were imposed, the U.S. steel industry generally appears to have consolidated. Some ailing steel firms, such as National Steel and Bethlehem Steel, were taken
over by larger competitors.4 7 The industry's largest union, the United Steel Workers of
America, agreed to more flexible work practices and profit sharing in order to give its
remaining members a chance to save their jobs. 4s In fact, more than 50 percent of the steelproduction capacity today is owned by companies that restructured. 49 It is noteworthy that
the tariffs apparently prompted major steel making nations to come to the negotiating table
at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) aiming to reduce world overcapacity in the international steel industry.5 0 All this change occurred since
the safeguard measure was invoked, but the critical issue is whether it happened as a result
of it. Gary Hufbauer of the Institute for International Economics warned against the post
hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy." However, at the same time, it would be unfair to completely
downplay the role of the safeguard measure in the brighter picture of today's steel industry.
Taken together and disregarding the particulars of the SG Agreement at this point it
appears that the U.S. government had a valid reason to exercise its state responsibility and
levy a safeguard measure, or any other trade remedy, in order to offset the serious economic
difficulties of one of its most important industries caused in part by increased international
competition. Furthermore, the safeguard measure imposed for the past twenty months
appears to provide some breathing room to the industry and facilitate its adjustment process.

m.

Genesis and Politics of the 'Escape Clause'

The U.S.-Steel case is a classic case showing that with the remarkable success of global
trade liberalization during the past half century, the international community apparently
forgot the historical foundation of the international trading regime in the aftermath of the
Second World War. This foundation, known as the "embedded liberalism" 2 bargain,was a
compromise between trade liberalization and state intervention to facilitate adjustments at
home.
Cognizant that, in theory, liberal trade policy creates vast economic benefits and welfare,
the global community pursued laissez-faire liberalism in the nineteenth century." But, with
the growing democratization of domestic politics, states became increasingly aware that
domestic needs could not be subordinated to the strictures of free trade. Meanwhile, the

47. Scrapped;America's Steel Tariffi, at http://www.economist.com (Dec. 5, 2003) [hereinafter Scrapped].
48. See, e.g., Paul Magnusson, TheLogic ofBush's Twisty Steel Policy; Conventional wisdom says the President's
now-abandoned steel tariffs were a failure. Look closer, and they sparked a string of quiet coups, December 5,
2003, at http://www.businessweek-com (quoting Thomas Usher, chairman and CEO of United States Steel,
said that the tariffs stabilized prices, allowed the U.S. industry to consolidate, stopped the flood of bankruptcies
and layoffs, and encouraged a wave of productivity-enhancing investment.) [hereinafter Magnusson]; see also A
Miracle atBethlehem, Eco NoMIsT, Jan. 9, 2003, available at www.theeconomist.com.
49. Magnusson, supra note 48.
50. Id. (Explaining that there has not been much progress in the OECD other than an implicit admission
by steel making nations for the need to reduce the global oversupply of steel. Many nations massively subsidize
or own outright their nation's steel plants, contributing to the distortion of the free market although the
government ownership itself should not be viewed to contribute to distorting competition).
51. Scrapped,supra note 47.
52. See Ruggie, supra note 9 at 393.
53. Id. at 385-86.

VOL. 38, NO. 4

TOWARD AN IDEAL WTO SAFEGUARDS REGIME

927

demand for state intervention to cushion the dislocations generated by trade liberalization
was on the rise.
According to international relations theory, this phenomenon can best be described by
the interplay of the liberal and constructivist strands.5 4 As a first step, the political dynamics
under which the U.S. government decided to impose the safeguard measure in U.S.-Steel
can be persuasively explained with the liberal theory. This theory presumes that state functions depend on "individual choices"" and disaggregates the state into its component parts,
focusing on individuals and organizations in order to predict and interpret state behaviors.
In short, the liberal theory shows that states interests are in great part shaped by domestic
politics.

56

7
However, the liberal theory, arguably positive, does not lend itself to normative theory.
In other words, the liberal theory does not dictate what states "should" do in the international setting, nor does it explain how and why states engage in international cooperation,
sometimes even going against domestic interests. In the world of the liberal theory, the
direct nexus between the will of the people and international law does not exist. The worlds
of "Sein" and "Sollen" are clearly divided.
Hence, a normative-based theory, constructivism or, more specifically, "embedded liberalism" in the global trading regime comes into play. The central premise of constructivism
is that a genuine community of actors exists in international politics, and these actors construct their own social structure and subsequently live and interact within it. The concept
of "embedded liberalism" depicts how states reconcile the value of free trade with the social
community in the hopes that market economies could thrive even further. Broadly speaking,
the notion of embedded liberalism implants a global trading order within a larger commitment to state intervention in domestic policies. Therefore, it appears to acknowledge
the influence of domestic interests in states policies as propounded by the liberal theory
scholars.
"Embedded liberalism" also translates into the proposition that safeguard provisions are
vital for "trade-liberalizing agreements as they function as both insurance mechanisms and
safety valves."" s This illustrates that safeguards were introduced to deal with domestic crisislike situations such as U.S.-Steel that may occur while pursuing globalized free trade. The
framers of GATT understood that domestic crises would arise due to unexpected developments in the global trading regime that could potentially destabilize the regime as a
whole and thus took steps to create a legal framework that addresses such concerns. They
conceded that states could derogate from the trade concessions under certain conditions to
effectively overcome domestic crises, making free trade more palatable to domestic indus-

54. Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Prferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of InternationalPolitics, 51 INT'L ORG.
513, 516 (1997).
55. Id. at 517.
56. Id. at 518.
57. William W Burke-White, Refraining Impunity: Applying Liberal InternationalLaw Theory to An Analysis
of Amnesty Legislation, 42 HAv. INT'L L. J. 467, 470-471 (2001).
58. BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM: FROM GATT TO WTO 161 (1995). However, for instance, Dr. Finger is very skeptical about safeguards, dubbing it "legalized backsliding." See J. Michael Finger, Legalized Backsliding: safeguardprovisions in
GATT in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING CouTcrmEs 316 (Will Martin & L. Alan Winters eds.,
1996).
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tries. In fact, Ruggie argues that the growing "new protectionism" that we are currently
59
witnessing is still a continuance of this norm from the outset of post-war liberalization.
To this end, the GATT assimilated in its core text several exceptions and emergency provisions such as articles XX and XIiX, 60 which together is dubbed the "escape
clause."6l During the Uruguay Round negotiations, the rights and obligations under article
XIX of GATT were elaborated in the SG Agreement.
As John Jackson pointed out, "[i]f there were no 'liberal trade' policy or practice, we
would not need to consider safeguards as such. ' '6 Safeguards were an expedient bargain
among the political leaders of GATT signatories. 63 The concept was to encourage states to
participate in the global trade liberalization undertaking by assuring national governments
that tools existed to deal with domestic crises.
Several widely recognized rationales exist for the assimilation of the safeguard action as
an exemption of the liberal trade policies. 64 First, in accordance with the concept of "embedded liberalism," the GATT and W'TO drafters, were aware that trade liberalization
agreements would increase international competition and encourage a more efficient allocation of resources. However, the concessions granted as a result of these agreements could
adversely impact the interests of particular domestic groups, so that national economic
interest might dictate a change in previously assumed obligations. By providing national
governments with a mechanism for derogating from concessions, safeguard provisions make
trade liberalization agreements more palatable to domestic interests and facilitate their
acknowledgement of the trade liberalization process.
Second, safeguard actions allow nations to temporarily restrict imports so that their adversely affected industries will be able to take the opportunity to carry out adjustments in
order to enhance their international competitiveness. Though costly, this forces competing
domestic firms to adjust to imports by improving their competitiveness or by reallocating
resources into the production of more competitive products.
And third, it may be more pragmatic to give into the idea of temporary import protection
as a means of not only alleviating the burdens of adjustment, but also alleviating domestic
pressures for a more drastic departure from the trade liberalization process. Safeguard policies become a "border buffer" to prevent too much pressure for change of the domestic
economic structure resulting from increased international trade" with economies ofvarying
65

structures.
The historical foundation of the escape clause, "embedded liberalism," illustrates that it
was introduced to deal with domestic crisis situations like in U.S.-Steel that emerge in the

59. See Ruggie, supra note 9.
60. World Trade Organization, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1997, Article XIX, available
at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/gatt47-02-e.html (last visited Oct. 15 2004). Article MIX,
commonly known as the 'escape clause,' permits emergency action against sharp increased in imports by auofunforeseen
thorizing a contracting party to withdraw concessions temporarily on specific products if, asa resul
developments, imports of those products are increasing rapidly and injuring the domestic industry.
61. JOHN JACKsON, THE WORLD TADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
153 (1989) [hereinafter JACKSON].
62. Id. at 149.
63. See, e.g., JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM 40-41 (1988); ROBERT E. BALDWIN, TRADE POLICY IN A
CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY 137-47 (1988).

64. See JACKSON, supra note 61 at 149.
65. Id. at 153.
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pursuit of global trade liberalization. As mentioned, the framers of GATT understood that
domestic crises would arise due to unexpected developments in the international trading
regime that could potentially destabilize the regime as a whole and, therefore, took steps
to create a legal framework that addresses such concerns. Essentially, they conceded that
nations could resort to protectionist measures to effectively overcome crises. Pursuant to
this argument, it is justifiable that the U.S. government imposed a safeguard measure on
steel imports to stave off further political and social instability that the crisis could have
generated. Given that organized labor's historic support for trade liberalization was premised upon the availability of such safeguard options to prevent massive dislocations, if the
United States ignored the cries of the U.S. steel industry, then skepticisms that trade liberalization undermines the sovereignty of the United States could have increased to even
greater heights.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to wholly dismiss the all-out allegations that the U.S. measure
was imposed for protectionist purposes and is a primafacieviolation of W'TO rules. In fact
by merely investigating the U.S. safeguards action, extraordinary attention was directed to
this case from the outset of the section 201 proceedings, suggesting that perhaps the United
States was bending the rules of the WTO. Why did the international community manifest
such a sensitive reaction at the mere announcement of the investigation of the United
States? In this respect, it is instructive to examine if the underlying principles of the SG
Agreement or any of the standards set by the Appellate Body give rise to criticisms "that
66
the safeguard remedy is the 'black sheep' of trade rules."
IV. Revisiting the Safeguards Regime under the WTO
It is informative to highlight some of the key dimensions of the disciplines governing the
WTO safeguards regime to later appraise which of such dimensions are entitled to a revision
or amendment. First, the SG Agreement aims to "clarify and reinforce GATT disciplines,
particularly those of article XIX," and "encourage structural ... adjustment of industries
adversely affected by increased imports, thereby enhancing competition in international
markets."16 The WTO Agreement, that is, article XIX of GATT and the SG Agreement,basically stipulates that a member state may temporarily invoke a safeguard measure or
escape from tariff concessions, if an increase in imports, either absolute or relative to domestic production, causes or threatens to cause serious injury to the domestic industry that
produces like or directly competitive products with that of the imported product. 69 Thus,

a member state must corroborate that the measure meets three seemingly clear-cut conditions in order to adopt a safeguard measure that complies with VITO rules: (1) increased
imports; (2) increased imports cause or threaten serious injury to domestic industry; and
(3) a causal link between the increased imports and the injury.

66. Written testimony of Congressmen Amo Houghton and Sander Levin before the U.S. International
Trade Commission, Sep. 25, 2001, available at http://www.house.gov/levin/09.25.01.html.
67. SG Agreement, supra note 17.
68. Id. The SG Agreement consists of (fourteen] articles and one annex. [mlt has four main components:
(1) general provisions (articles I and 2); (2) rules members' governing application of new safeguard measures
(articles 3-9); (3) rules pertaining to pre-existing measures that were applied before the WTO's entry into force
(articles 10 and 11); and (4) multilateral surveillance and institutions (articles 12-14).
69. Id.
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The SG Agreement also sets out in article 3 the specific requirements for safeguards
investigations that should be carried out by the national authorities. 0 Article 4 establishes
the requirements for meeting the serious injury criteria and states that in determining
whether serious injury or threat of serious injury exists, investigating authorities should
evaluate all relevant factors having a bearing on the condition of the industry, so as not to
attribute injury caused by other factors to imports." Article 5 stipulates that a safeguard
measure should be applied "only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury
2
and to facilitate adjustment" of the domestic industry. A safeguard measure should not
last more than four years, but it may be extended on the basis of a new finding that the
measure continues to be necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and that the domestic
industry is adjusting. 3 Article 8 states that when invoking a safeguard measure, the member
State must maintain a "substantially equivalent level of concessions and other obligations"
with respect to affected exporting nations by agreeing upon any adequate means of trade
compensation with the affected member States.' 4 If no agreement is reached, the affected
exporting member State may suspend substantially equivalent concessions and other obligations." However, this right cannot be exercised during the first three years of the application of a safeguard measure if the measure is taken based on an absolute increase in
imports and complies with the WTO Agreement.' 6 Article 9 renders special consideration
to member developing countries by establishing that an importing country cannot apply a
safeguard measure to imports from a developing country if the developing country is supplying less than 3 percent of the imports, or if developing countries with less than 3 percent
import share collectively account for more than 9 percent of total imports."
A. EMERGING PROBLEMS IN TODAY'S SAFEGUARDS INSTITUTION

Safeguard measures are not frequently invoked compared to the anti-dumping and countervailing options that are available.'" This low rate of utilization can be attributed to the
following points. First, safeguard remedies are subject to non-discriminatory application
that leads to a reluctance of most national governments to take action against all nations
when products from only a handful of nations are the source of the disruption. The second
point, which is inherently linked to the principle of non-discrimination, is that governments
9
are disinclined to pay compensation to all nations affected by a safeguard measure. And,

70. Id. art. 3.
71. Id. art. 4.
72. Id. art. 5.
73. Id. art. 8.
74. Id. art. 8.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. art. 9.
78. See Chad P. Brown, Why are safeguards under the VeTO so unpopular?, WORLD TRADE REv. 47, 49
of the INTO, twenty safeguard measures were undertaken while 333 definitive
(2002). In the first five years
anti-dumping measures were imposed between 1995 and 1997.

79. See id. Professor Marco Bronckers opines that "an important reason, at least for some members like the
EU, for not using safeguards that much is that they find it difficult to draw the line between justifiable and
unjustifiable restrictions on supposedly fair trade. The EU's concern in particular is that if safeguards are more
easily available, it will become difficult to protect EU exporters against market restrictions abroad" in the email

dated March 15, 2004 (on file with the auther).
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third, governments hoping to 'manage trade'8° favor the Anti-dumping Agreement (AD
Agreement) over the SG Agreement.
Nevertheless, the number of safeguard cases has been on the rise. The SG Agreement
was invoked in two cases when it went into effect in 1995. From November 10, 2001 to
October 29, 2001, the WTO Committee of Safeguards reviewed thirty notifications under
article 12.4.11 Several reasons are attributed to this sudden increase in the use of safeguard
measures. First, since reimbursing compensation to all member States is an impractical
notion in the first place, governments no longer appear to be obligated to abide by this
principle at all. Second, some of the rules governing the safeguard regime, article XIX of
GATT and the SG Agreement, are considered to be ambiguous at best, providing ample
room for nations to interpret the legal text in a flexible manner and to justify their use of
safeguard protection in virtually all circumstances. Some progress was made during the
Uruguay Round in reinforcing the rules, but much more remains to be done. Third, since
safeguard measures usually apply across the board to all exporters of a given product, it can
incontestably render a lot more protection to one's domestic industry than anti-dumping
and countervailing measures. Fourth, it is more convenient and less costly to impose the
safeguard than other forms of import relief measures. The procedural hoops in antidumping and countervailing cases are more burdensome and expensive compared to safeguards, because such cases warrant the analysis and verification of the margins of dumping
or subsidy for exporters, as it requires, inter alia, sending officials abroad to investigate the
true cost of manufacturing the goods in question. For safeguards, the only requisite investigation is to assess whether there is serious injury to the specific domestic industry. Fifth,
some contend that seasoned lawyers are now to adept at manipulating accounting figures
for the dumping margins to be de minimis, making it harder for nations to impose lawful
anti-dumping duties. In short, safeguards are likely to see further proliferation under the
current framework.
As much as it is facile to impose safeguards, the repercussions of imposing these measures
are fatal. Once a safeguard is imposed, there is practically no way for the respondent country
to prevent it, with the exception of filing a complaint with the WVTO dispute settlement
system, which takes nearly three years for the proceedings to end. And, since the WTO
agreement is not retroactive, even if the panel or Appellate Body finds the measure to
constitute a violation of the WTO agreement, the safeguard imposing country has no other
duty but to merely withdraw it, or worse, to re-investigate with the intention to place the
measure in compliance with WTO rules.
Nevertheless, the application of a safeguard measure that is virtually certain to be overturned by the Appellate Body may have significant benefit for the protected domestic industry. To illustrate this point, in U.S.-Lamb Meat, the United States imposed safeguard
measures on July 7, 1999, while the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) did not adopt the
Appellate Body report until May 16, 2 001.12 By agreement of the parties, the safeguard was

80. Id. at 50, 53. In the AD Agreement, managed trade agreements by way of voluntary price undertakings
are acceptable compared to the imposition of anti-dumping duties. Price undertakings are agreements between
the investigating authority and the foreign exporting firm in which the firm agrees to raise its price to a level
that eliminates the dumping margin.
81. See World Trade Organization, available at http://www.wto.org (last visited October 13, 2004).
82. Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of the Meeting, WTIDSB/M/105, Doc. Num. 01-3061, availableat
http://docsonline.wto.org (June 19, 2001).
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eliminated in November 2001, almost two and a half years after the initial imposition of
the measure. Thus, notwithstanding the Appellate Body decision, the American lamb meat
industry enjoyed more than two years of protection. Additionally, under the SG Agreement,
a member State whose exports are subject to another's safeguard measures may not exercise
its right to suspend concessions until three years, provided that the measure was taken as a
result of an absolute increase in imports and that such measure conforms to the provisions
of SG Agreement. In short, a member State that decides to impose safeguards can reasonably attain more than a two-year free ride until the DSB finds the measure to be in violation
of relevant rules and a period of at least several months until compliance is agreed upon
before any retaliation is likely to occur.
The Appellate Body, in symphony with the rest of the critics, ruled that in U.S.-Steel the
United States did not apply the safeguard measure against imported steel in a manner that
was in conformity with the WTO Agreement and recommended that the measure be
brought into compliance with the obligations under the WTO Agreement." However, the
Appellate Body has ruled against every safeguard measure brought before the VVTO dispute
settlement system. This, at first blush, does not carry great import since the Appellate Body
by and large finds fault with many of the cases brought to its attention. Rather, the problem
lies in the language of the WTO Agreement governing the safeguards regime that apparently is not clear enough to provide an effective level of discipline on national practices.
Drawing upon the ambiguous language of the WTO Agreement, the Appellate Body in
turn appeared to set forth a handful of narrow and strict interpretations of the conditions
under which "escape" from the WTO obligations is permissible. Its position is well documented in its statement that "safeguard measures are extraordinary remedies to be taken
48
only in emergency situations.
B.

PRINCIPLES OF NON-DISCRIMINATION AND COMPENSATION

The dominant features or principles governing the safeguard measures are largely the
following. First, the measure must be temporary and must be imposed only when imports
are causing or threatening serious injury to a domestic industry. Second, the measure should
not target imports from a particular nation, but must be applied in a non-discriminatory
manner to all nations, otherwise known as the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle.
Third, the member State imposing the safeguard measure must pay compensation to other
member States whose trade is affected by the measure. Among these overriding principles
constituting the safeguards regime, it is instructive to revisit the latter two principles, the
principles of non-discrimination and compensation, to examine whether they are in any
way contributing to the maelstrom of skepticisms against nations resorting to safeguard

83. See U.S.-Steel, supra note 2, at para. 514. This is not the first time the Appellate Body ruled against a
safeguard measure imposed by the United States; it is the fourth one. Since the inception of the WTO in 1995,
the United States lost three other smaller cases in which it tried to restrict imports on similar legal principles
and disciplines cited in U.S.-Steel. The three cases are United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities (U.S.-Wheat Gluten), United States-SafeguardMeasures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia (U.S.-Lamb), United
States-Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea

(U.S.-Line Pipe).
84. U.S.-Line Pipe, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS202/AB/R, TT 80-85, doc. Num 02-0717 (Feb. 15,
2002), available at http://docsonline.wto.org [hereinafter U.S.-Line Pipe].
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measures. The legitimacy of such principles has been gready contested among the trading
partners ever since the appearance of the post-war international trading regime.
1. Non-discriminatoryPrinciple
First and foremost, the non-discriminatory principle or the MFN principle is a baseline
requiring all measures imposed pursuant to the SG Agreement to be applied equally to all
nations. The MFN principle avoids economic efficiency losses by minimizing the trade
diversion associated with safeguard remedies when countries discriminate among foreign
exporters and shift imports to less-efficient exporters. It achieves this purpose by imposing
a common burden on all exporters." In addition, by increasing the number of adversely
affected exporting countries, the combined pressures against the initial invocation of safeguard remedy for the withdrawal of the safeguard measures and the reimbursement of
compensation act as deterrents against unwarranted exercise of the safeguard remedy.
This cardinal principle is enshrined, inter alia, in article 2.2 of the SG Agreement, which
stipulates, "[s]afeguard measures shall be applied to a product being imported irrespective
of its source."8 6 Yet, the SG Agreement allows for discriminatory measures under limited
circumstances subject to the supervision of the WTO Safeguards Council, including choice
of trade restricting measures8 ' (quotas, Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQ)), exemptions to developing countries pursuant to article 9.1,8 and arguably exemptions to FTA partners pursuant
to article XXIV of the GATT.
Whether safeguard measures could be imposed on a non-discriminatory or selective basis,
the right to invoke a safeguard action on only those nations whose imports are the greatest
cause of serious injury is an important issue among the trading partners from the outset of
the global trading system. The selectivity issue forestalled a host of attempts by negotiators
of both the GATT and WTO to reconcile differences of opinions on the safeguards regime.
In essence, selectivity remained a source of contention for each of the trade rounds. 9
Although the MFN application of article XIX of GATT is not explicitly written in the
text, the concept appears to have first surfaced during the London ITO Conference in
1946. The United States submitted an internal U.S. memorandum introducing the escape
clause as a proposal that eventually became the groundwork of the escape clause. The
memorandum states that regarding the escape clauses in the U.S. bilateral trade agreements,
the United States "had no authority to take action under such a clause in other than a nondiscriminatory manner and therefore must have contemplated its non-discriminatory use."90

85. See MARCO C.EJ. BRONCKERS,SELECTIVE SAFEGUARD IN MEASURES MULTILATERAL TRADE RELATIONS:
ISSUES OF PROTECTIONISM IN GATT, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND UNITED STATES LAw (1985).
86. SG Agreement, supra note 17, art. 2.
87. Id. art. 5. For instance, article 5.2(a) of the SG Agreement reads,
"[iln cases in which a quota is allocated among supplying countries, the Member applying the restrictions ... shall allot to Members having a substantial interest in supplying the product shares based
upon the proportions, supplied by such Members during a previous representative period, of the total
quantity or value of imports of the product..
88. Id. art. 9.
89. See generally, Marco C.EJ. Bronckers, The non-discriminatoryapplication of Article XIX GATf: Tradition
or Fiction?,2 LEGAL IssUs EUR. INTEGRATION, 35-76 (1981); Contra Mark Koulen, The non-discriminatoryinterpretation of GATTArticle XIX()-A reply, 2 LEGAL ISSUES OF Eus. INTEGRATION, 97-111 (1983).
90. Cited in Rationale for Dealing with Market Disruption Through the Application of Article XIX, reproduced as Annex 2 to GATT, Modalities of Application of Article XIX, Doe. L/4679 at 47 (1978).
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In addition, at the Havana ITO Conference that took place shortly after GATT was concluded, the contracting parties came to an agreement on an interpretive note that safeguard
actions under Article XIX "must not discriminate against imports from any member country, and that such action should avoid, to the fullest extent possible, injury to other supplying
9
member countries." '
Despite an implicit agreement on the MFN application of article XIX, compelling legal
arguments exist to shore up the notion that selective remedies are not inconsistent with
article XIX. GATT contracting parties never unequivocally endorsed the non-discriminatory
application of article XIX. In fact, the case for selectivity was first proposed when Japan
acceded to the GATT in 1955. Some contracting parties thought that adopting restraints
against all importers when Japanese imports were mainly causing the serious injury might
culminate in an overall increase in trade protectionism around the globe. The European
Communities, inter alia, emphatically advocated for a selective safeguard regime, and the
developing countries for a non-discriminatory application.9 2 However, in the Norwegian
Textiles case, the GATT Panel affirmed the application of the non-discrimination principle
of Article XIII GATT to safeguard actions under Article XIX GATT.93
The unrelenting debate over the non-discrimination application of safeguard measures
is understandable. First, the increasing adoption of unfair trade remedies such as antidumping and countervailing duties that impose duties selectively on particular sources of
imports implies a high degree of substitutability amongst these trade remedies. More importantly, the principle will most likely result in a large number of nations that are eligible
for compensation. The imposition of temporary relief against imports from all countries,
when the principal source of disruptive imports from only few is identifiable, may, in essence, constitute unfairness toward the non-damage inflicting countries.
This leads to the question of why countries, whose exports are not responsible for the
injury would have to pay the additional tariffs. It may only be a natural consequence that
nations become extremely vulnerable and feel as if their export products are being discriminated against for no valid reason, resulting in automatic denunciations against the nation
imposing the measure. It may be true that the purpose for introducing the non-discrimination
application was to discourage the use of safeguards, since they are supposedly imposed on
fair trade. However, when nations decide to take advantage of the ambiguity existing in the
SG Agreement, the majority of the nations are inflicted with unnecessary damage, potentially causing a destabilization of the international trading regime.
From the foregoing, the MFN principle is not so firmly rooted as it appears in the
safeguard regime. The drafting history of article XIX of GATT and the SG Agreement
appear to be vague at best regarding the non-discriminatory application. The only strong
source appears to be the U.S. memorandum submitted at the London ITO Conference
that eventually became the framework of article XIX and the interpretive note annexed to
the Havana Charter. 94 Aside from these procedural arguments, the costs of the nondiscriminatory application appear to be greater than that of the selective application. Therefore, assuming that the SG Agreement will be incorporated in the agenda of future trade

91. GAT, Analytical Index: Notes on the Drafting, Interpretation and Application of the Articles of the
General Agreement 106, 108 (3d Revision 1979).
92. See ROBERT

HOWSE & MICHAELJ. TREBILCOCK, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

234 (1999).

93. Norway-Restrictions on Imports of Certain Textile Products, L/4959-27S/1 19 (24 March 1980).
94. See Bronckers, supra note 85.
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rounds, subsequent negotiators of the SG Agreement should seriously consider the possibility of revisiting the SG Agreement by conceding to a selective safeguard regime in particular circumstances. By doing so, a nation would have more flexibility to impose a safeguard when its domestic industry is undergoing serious injury due to increased imports,
without being mindful of the outright criticisms of the international community and the
Appellate Body. At the same time, the domestic industry undergoing serious injury would
still be able to receive temporary protection from the sources of imports that are causing
the disruption, since the safeguard measure would be imposed on only those nations that
are causing the serious injury. A selective safeguard regime would also create a clear-cut
SG Agreement that eradicates many of the extant problems in carrying out correct legal
interpretations of several politically sensitive provisions. National authorities would no
longer need to conduct painstaking investigations on virtually all importing countries, only
to go through another controversial process of exempting developing countries as obligated
under article 9.1 of the SG Agreement and FTA partners pursuant to article XXIV of the
GATT
The standard of determining a developing country is ambiguous, as can be seen in U.S.Steel. China, for the first time since its admission to the WTO in 2001, filed a complaint
with the WTO dispute settlement against the U.S. safeguard measure regarding imported
steel. China's greatest interest in this case was the criteria employed by the USITC to
determine which countries are regarded as developing countries. China argued it was a
developing country because it met the requirements of article 9.1, thus, it should have been
exempted from the measure. However, the provision does not set out a clear standard or
principle that determines which member states are developing countries. The Panel resorted to the judicial economy principle, explaining that it did not find it necessary to rule
9
on the issue of whether the U.S. safeguard measure violated the SG Agreement. However,
it appears as if the Panel deliberately evaded this question, since after all one of the most
highly politically contested issues in the international community today is determining
whether China is in fact a developing country. This contentious issue can be easily resolved
by resorting to the selective safeguard mechanism.
Another problematic dimension of the MFN application is the exemption rendered to
FTA partners. The issue of whether it is permissible to exempt safeguard measures for
regional trading arrangements meeting article XXIV negotiations is controversial in practice because it appears to be a violation of the MFN principle set forth in the SG Agreement.
Several regional trading arrangements have excluded regional partners from the application
of safeguards measures, since many of the FTAs, namely the North American Free Trade
96
Agreement (NAFTA), already have incorporated a provision allowing the exemption of
global safeguard measures. Accordingly, in U.S.-Line Pipe and U.S.-Steel, the Unites States
excluded its NAFTA partners, Canada and Mexico, from the safeguard measure, stating
that their exemption is justified under article XXIV of GATT.The United States argued
that the GATT and WTO Agreements are one integral agreement that gives any member
state the right to resort to article XXfV The United States further argued that, it could
resort to footnote 1 of the SG Agreement, which stipulates, "[a] customs union may apply

95. U.S.-Steel, Final Report of the Panel $ 10.712-714, Doc. Num. 03-3480, available at http://
docsonline.wto.org (last visited Oct. 13, 2004).
96. See North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 802, available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org (last
visited October 13, 2004).
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a safeguard measure as a single unit or on behalf of a member State. .. [n]othing in this
Agreement prejudges the interpretation of the relationship between [a]rticle XIX and paragraph 8 of [a]rticle XXIV of GATT 1994." 97 However, it is questionable whether the
footnote applies only to custom unions or can be applied to FTAs as well. Albeit this issue
was a source of objection for the complainants in these cases, the Appellate Body sidestepped
the legality of whether article XXIV would in itself justify an exclusion of another FTA or
customs union and merely resorted to the principle of judicial economy, 9 most likely once
again because of its political nature.
It is unfortunate the Appellate Body does not give clarification to this issue, while member
states are still trying to come eye to eye with its correct legal interpretation, which is a
constant source of conflict in FTA negotiations. By introducing the selective safeguard
mechanism, 99 the USITC would not need to go through the substantive and procedural
burden of exempting its FTA partners, if their imports were not a substantial cause of
serious injury.
All in all, a selective safeguard mechanism would be less susceptible to criticism as a
disguised protectionist measure, for its impact would be far less than that of an MFN
application. It would clearly eliminate a host of the current obligations and problems burdening a nation which imposes a safeguard measure. In this regard, a selective safeguard
regime would incontestably bring forth more stability into the international trading order.
It is true, nevertheless, that despite such benefits the possibility exists that the revised
mechanism would result in a proliferation of safeguard measures that may be protectionist
in nature. However, eliminating the ambiguities that exist in the language of the SG Agreement can ameliorate such concerns. Loopholes should be tightened, while the restrictive
standards set out by the Appellate Body, as elaborated later, should be loosened. In this
sense, the enhanced transparency and simplified version of the SG Agreement would allow
other member states to easily monitor the safeguards investigation and clearly to assess the
validity of the measure on legal grounds.
Indeed, it is true that the ambiguities were purposefully placed in the SG Agreement
initially so that nations would jump onto the bandwagon of trade liberalization in the
construction of the postwar international trading regime. However, in today's international
trading era, the majority of countries are cognizant of the extraordinary benefits of free
trade and genuinely committed to the free trade initiative. The time has come to clarify
the extant ambiguities in the SG Agreement so that countries can impose a safeguards

97. SG Agreement, supra note 17, at comment 1.
98. See U.S.-Line Pipe,supra note 66; U.S.-Steel, supra note 2. The Appellate Body ruled that the exemption
of NAFTA parmers constituted a violation of parallelism, meaning the exclusion of other members of an FTA
or customs union is at the member's peril. If the imports from the FTA member country are included in the
injury determination, they cannot be excluded from the remedy.
99. DouG.LAs A. IRWIN, FREE TRADE UNDER FIRE, 127-28 (Princeton Univ. Press 2002). A selective safeguard
regime may be more beneficial to the global trading order than the anti-dumping remedy, which is yet more
widely employed. The main problem with anti-dumping is that these laws are written with the assumption that
price discrimination is a problem, when in fact price discrimination is not inherently harmful or anticompetitive. Anti-dumping laws have allegedly been a popular means by which the domestic industry can
suppress foreign competition under the pretense of "fair trade." However, the problem for the domestic industry
is that prices are declining everywhere due to unforeseen developments, even if domestic prices are higher than
foreign prices. "It may be reasonable to provide an industry facing such difficulties with temporary protection
without any claim that trade is "unfair." And that is precisely what the escape clause is designed to do."
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measure that can be justified with the WTO and sympathized with by the rest of the
international community.
2. CompensationPrinciple
The principle of compensation dictates that if a country imposes a safeguard measure to
protect domestic producers the country must give something in return. 1 When a nation
adopts a safeguard action, member states can agree on an "adequate means of trade compensation" by way of prior consultations as stipulated in article 8 of the SG Agreement.10
If no agreement is reached, the exporting nation can suspend the application of substantially
equivalent concessions or retaliate. 02
Under article XIX of GATT, a contracting party whose exports were subject to a safeguard measure imposed by another contracting party was entitled either to receive alternative trade concessions or, if no agreement was reached, to suspend equivalent concessions
toward the party imposing the measure. 03 The SG Agreement, however, contains the new
safe harbor that disallows such immediate retaliation. If the safeguard measure conforms
to the SG Agreement and was imposed as a result of an absolute increase in imports, other
parties may not exercise a right of suspension for the first three years the measure is
applied." 4
The principle of compensation is somewhat problematic in the present safeguard regime.
First, the obligation to render compensation to all states, a direct result of the nondiscrimination principle impacted by the safeguard measure, is rather infeasible and time
consuming. Because the compensation amount is most likely to be exorbitant, states imposing the safeguard measure may not even seriously ponder the notion of providing compensation in the first place. In fact, the United States never or arguably never made a serious
effort to provide compensation in prior cases such as in U.S.-Line Pipeand U.S.-Steelbecause
the concept arguably falls short of practicality.0 5 To a certain extent, it seems illogical and
runs contrary to the underlying purpose of the safeguards that a state imposing a safeguard
measure, which as such should be very costly to its economy, would be obligated to pay
compensation to other states for doing so.
Second, even if a member state decides to render an adequate means of compensation
with certain developed countries, this may not be as feasible in practice. Rounds of trade
negotiations on tariffs have lowered the average tariffs of developed countries to a great
extent."°6 The Uruguay Round further reduced the tariff rate of industrial products in
developed nations from 6.3 percent to 3.8 percent, which is a decline of roughly forty
percent. 0 71 Such low-level tariff rates have made it difficult and will become continue to
make it more difficult to provide compensatory concessions in the form of tariff reductions
to states affected by safeguard actions. Additionally, deciding on the sectors in which the
tariffs will be reduced is another politically sensitive issue, for it would be difficult to imagine

100. SG Agreement, supra note 17, art. 8.3.
101. Id. art. 8, para. 1.
102. Id. art. 2.
103. Id. art. 1.
104. Id. art. 3.
105. See U.S.-Line Pipe, supra note 87; U.S.-Steel, supra note 2.
106. See World Trade Organization, Tariffi: More Bindings and Closer to Zero (2003) at http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tife/agrm2_ e.htm.
107. Id.
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a domestic industry being in favor of reducing the import tariffs and allowing more foreign
competition. Hence, as average tariffs continue to decline, the ability to level out the effects
of emergency actions through compensation may be reduced, culminating in increased
threats of retaliation.
Third, the timing of notification to the WTO Council for Trade in Goods (CTG) for
retaliation by the responding country as stipulated in article 8, is equivocal and conflicting.
This issue is naturally associated with compensation. Articles 8.2 and 8.3 create ambiguity
regarding the timing of the right of cross-suspension. Article 8.2 provides in part:
[ilf no agreement is reached within 30 days paragraph 3 of Article 12, then the affected exporting Members shall be free, not later than 90 days after the measure is applied, to suspend,
upon the expiration of 30 days from the day on which written notice of such suspension is
received by the Council for Trade in Goods, the application of substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations under GATT 1994 .... 101
Article 8.3 reads:
[tihe right of suspension ... shall not be exercised for the first three years that a safeguard
measure is in effect, under the condition that the measure has been taken as a result of an
absolute increase in imports and that such a measure conforms to the provisions of this Agreement.°'°
To illustrate this point, in U.S.-Steel, on May 14, 2001, the European Union and Japan
notified their respective retaliation lists, short and long, to the WTO CTG, while China
notified only its long list.I1o A short-term retaliation list can be established if there is a
showing that the tariffs were imposed without an "absolute increase" in steel imports. The
long list affects more products than the short list and covers the equivalent to the full impact
of the U.S. measure, and it would only enter into effect three years after the measure was
imposed or after the WTO DSB determines the U.S. measure is not in compliance with
the VWTO Agreement, whichever comes earlier. The short list may be in conformity with
article 8 if the complainants and the United States agree that there is an absolute increase
in imports or agree to submit the issue to an arbitrator who finds that the condition was
met, both, however, are unlikely results."'
By contrast, the legality of the long list appears problematic for the following reasons.
Article 8.2 gives a right to suspend concessions to a member state negatively affected by
the safeguard measure, but the timing of the right is conditioned in two ways." 2 First, as
mentioned above, if there is not an absolute increase in imports or if there is a consensus
that the measure is not in compliance with the SG Agreement, article 8.2 stipulates that
the right of retaliation should be exercised within a ninety-day period." 3
Conversely, when it cannot be proven that imports increased on an absolute basis or
when the measure does not abide by the WTO Agreement, article 8.3 provides that the
right of retaliation cannot be exercised for three years.1 4 However, when the panel determines that the measure does not abide by the SG Agreement, suspension could take place

108. SG Agreement, supra note 17, art. 8, para. 2 (emphasis added).
109. Id. art. 8, para. 3 (emphasis added).
110. Notification Document of China, May 17, 2002,G/C/17, G/SG/46 (2002).
111. See SG Agreement, supra note 17, art. 8, para 1.

112. Id. art. 2.
113. Id.
114. Id. art. 3.
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in less than three years."' But this is still later than the ninety-day period as required by
article 8.2, and the right to retaliate may no longer be available for the respondent country.
This is because that right could never be exercised under article 8.3 which prohibits any
cross-suspension during the ninety-day period if member states contest the validity of the
safeguard measure or contest whether the level of imports increased absolutely during some
6
undetermined period of time prior to the application of the safeguard measure."
Complainants, such as Korea, extended the ninety-day period to three years by making
a separate procedural agreement with the United States, with the intent of complying with
article 8.3."' This may have been the safest approach to preserve the right to cross-suspend
after the ninety-day period, but the European Union, Japan, and China reserved their rights
to retaliate after three years or when the WTO DSB determines the U.S. measure is not
in conformity with the SG Agreement without having made any procedural extension agreement with the United States."' An argument could be made that the ninety-day period in
article 8.2, when read in context of article 8.3, permits a member state to retaliate after
ninety days even where there is no procedural agreement. However, the United States could
argue that any suspension after the ninety-day period by the European Union, Japan, or
China would violate article 8, and there is textual support for this argument. Whatever the
case may be, there is a defect in the text, and any interpretation is subject to some controversy. Either the member states or the Appellate Body should set out a clear cut standard
for the provision so as to eradicate the serious ambiguity in the text.
C.

STANDARD OF REVIEW OF THE APPELLATE BODY

Panels and the Appellate Body should respect national government determinations to a
certain degree, which has been labeled the "standard of review." The standard-of-review
refers to how the panel and the Appellate Body should evaluate and defer to the factual and
legal determinations of national authorities. This question became something of a touchstone regarding the relationship of sovereignty concepts to the GATT/WTO rule system.
Article 11 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) sets forth the standardof-review of the WTO panel and the Appellate Body" 9 by obligating the panel to make an
"objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts
of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant" 20 WTO agreement.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. U.S.-Steel, supra note 2, para. 136.
118. Id. para. 69, 89, 118.
119. While article 11 of the DSU provides rules that apply to a panel's examination of issues arising under
any of the covered agreements of the WTO, article 17.6 sets forth rules relating to issues arising under only
the AD Agreement.
120. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15,
1994, Underestimating on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement Disputes 33 I.L.M. 1140 [hereinafter DSU]. Article 11 of the DSU provides in part,
"a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment
of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements,
and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the
rulings provided for in the covered agreements."
See Steven P, Croley and John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Settlement Panel Deference to National Government
Decisions: The Misplaced Analogy to the U.S. Chevron Standard-of-Review Doctrine, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw
AND THE GATT/WTO DisurrE SETTLEMENT SYsTEM 87, 189 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1997), see alro
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The Appellate Body interpreted this requirement to mean that panels should neither conduct a new review of the fact-findings of the national authorities, often referred to as a "de
novo review" nor render total deference to domestic agency determinations. 2 ' In rejecting
both these extremes, the Appellate Body found that the panels are poorly suited to engage
in new reviews and cannot ensure an objective assessment by total deference to national
agency determinations. 22
As for he standard-of-review of facts, in U.S.-Lamb Meat, the Appellate Body noted that
for an "objective assessment," "a panel must review whether competent authorities have
evaluated all relevant factors, and ...whether the authorities have provided a reasoned and
adequate explanation of how the facts support their determination."' 23 As for the standardof-review of legal issues, it is well established that panels and the Appellate Body interpret
the language of WTO agreements by relying on article 31 and article 32 of the Vienna
Convention of the Law of Treaty. 24 In short, panels are required to review whether the
national authorities actually reviewed all the relevant factors, and with regard to the application of law to the facts, panels must determine whether the national authorities' explanation of how the facts support the legal interpretation is "reasoned and adequate."2s
In actuality, the application of the standard-of-review is quite controversial.z6 Some commentators of U.S.-Line Pipe, for instance, forcefully charged that the Panel and the Appellate
Body imposed the new unmeetable requirement to separate, distinguish and quantify every
possible cause of injury-a methodology not found in the language of the SG Agreement. 2 7
Similar charges were hurled against the interpretation of "unforeseen developments" as set
forth in GAIT article XIX. 2 An argument can be made that the WTO panels and the
Anti-Dumping Agreement, art. VI. of GATT 1994, available at hntp://www.wto.orglenglish/docs.e/legal-e/
legal-e.htm (date). Article 17.6 of the AD Agreement is more specific than article 11 of the DSU and calls for
more deference to the determination of the domestic authorities.
Article 17.6 provides that
[i]n examining the matter referred to in paragraph 5: (i) in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the
panel shall determine whether the authorities' establishment of the facts was proper and whether their
evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective. If the establishment of the facts was proper and
the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even though the panel might have reached a different
conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned; (ii) the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions
of the Agreement in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.
Where the panel finds that a relevant provision of the Agreement admits of more than one permissible
interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities' measure to be in conformity with the Agreement if
it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations.
121. U.S.-Lamb Meat, supra note 83, para. 101.
122. Id.
123. Id., para. 103.
124. Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in VFO Dispute Resolution, 6 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 3, 635, 656-58
(2003) at http://www3.oup.co.uk/journals. Some commentators argue that the standard of review of laws is less
controversial for this reason.
125. U.S.-Lamb Meat, supra note 86, para. 103.
126. See Claus-Dieter Ehlermarm, World Trade Organization, Some Personal Experience as Member of the
Appellate Body of the WTO, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 4 605, 621 (Aug. 2002), available at http://www.kluwerlaw
online.com. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, former member of Appellate Body recalled that the standard of review
has become one of the most controversial issues in the WTO adjudication.
127. John R. Magnus et al., hat Do All These Adverse WTO Decisions Mean, GULC TRADE UPDATE, (Jan.
30, 2003), availableat http://www.dbtrade.compublications/articles.hm.
128. Id. The Appellate Body mandated authorities to consider whether increasing imports resulted from
"unforeseen developments," a GATT 1947 requirement intentionally omitted from WTO Safeguard Agreement.
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Appellate Body's overreach of authority may be the fundamental reason that to date there
29
is no safeguard case that passed the muster of the requirements of the WTO Agreement.1
In fact, the existing ambiguities of the SG Agreement have led the Appellate Body to craft
legal standards, some of which seem either too stringent or too vague.
There are other standards (set out by the Appellate Body) such as increased imports,
unforeseen developments and parallelism, which deserve close scrutiny. Due to limited
space this section will focus on the Appellate Body's standard-of-review related to the causation methodology.
In U.S.-Steel, complainants argued that the U.S. safeguard measure violated article 2.1
and article 4.2(b) of the SG Agreement by failing to establish the necessary causal link
between increased imports and serious injury and by failing to comply with the obligation
that injury from other factors should not be attributed to imports. 3 ° Article 2.1 provides
in part that:
A Member may apply a safeguard measure to a product only if that member has determined,
pursuant to the provisions set out below, that such product is being imported into its territory
in such increased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, and under such conditions, as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry that produces
like or directly competitive products.' 3 '
Article 4.2(b) provides that the injury determination of serious injury:
shall not be made unless this investigation demonstrates, on the basis of objective evidence,
the existence of the causallink between increased imports of the product concerned and serious
injury or threat thereof. When factors other than increased imports are causing injury to the domestic industry at the same time, such injury shall not be attributedto increasedimports.'32
These two provisions establish the standard for causation. The standard for meeting the
causation analysis was formally dealt with first in Argentina-Footwear."1 The Appellate Body
3 4
upheld the three standards established by the Panel to meet the causation requirement.
First, there should be a coincidence of trends as between an upward trend in imports and
a downward trend in injury factors.' 35 Second, the conditions of competition should demonstrate a causal link between imports and injury. Finally, it should be established that injury
caused by factors other than imports is not been attributed to imports. 36 The first two
standards are relatively easy to satisfy.' The problem seems to lie in the third nonattribution standard. The Appellate Body qualifies this standard in U.S.-Whbeat Gluten by
stressing that the focus of the non-attribution standard is on the effects of the various causes,

129. U.S. Gen. Acct. Off., World Trade Organization:Standard of Review and Impact of Trade Remedy Rulings,
Gao-03-824 (Jul. 2003). Contrasting views also hold force.
130. U.S.-Steel, supra note 2 para 10.279.
131. SG Agreement, supra note 17, at art. 2, para. 1.
132. Id. art. 4, para. 2 (emphasis added).
133. Panel Report, Argentina-Safeguardson Imports ofFootwear,WTIDS12lJRC (June 25, 1999) [hereinafter Argentina-Footwear Panel Report]; Appellate Body Report, Argentina-SafeguardsMeaureson Imports
of Footwear, WVT/DS/AB/R (Dec. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Argentina-Footwear Appellate Body Report].
134. Argentina-Footwear Appellate Body Report, supra note 133.
135. Id.
136. Id. paras. 141-42.
137. See U.S.-Wbeat Gluten, supra note 83.
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such that the inquiry should not be whether imports alone are causing injury. 3 ' Rather, the
authorities should ensure that the effects from other factors are not attributed to imports'Y9
In U.S.-Line Pipe, the Appellate Body elaborated on the type of explanation that is required
to demonstrate that they complied with the non-attribution requirement by requiring that
that investigating authorities "establish explicitly, through a reasoned and adequate explanation that injury caused by factors other than increased imports is not attributed to increased
imports."' ° This14explanation must be "clear and unambiguous" and must be expounded in
"express terms.' ' To do so, the investigating authority should properly separate, distin42
guish and assess the "nature and extent of the injurious effects of those other factors."1
The United States, in most safeguard cases including U.S.-Steel, rather than separating out
the injurious effects of each of these factors from that of increased imports, merely analyzed
the relative causal importance of these factors ("substantial cause" test) by determining
whether any factor is a more important cause of injury than increased imports in accordance
with its domestic law (section 201 of U.S. trade law). And in turn the Appellate Body ruled
that the United States failed to comply with the condition of establishing the causal link in
43
every case.
Assuring that injury caused by other sources is not erroneously attributed to imports is
a concept that appears deceptively simple in theory but complex in practice, since competent
authorities operate in strict time limitations and, at times, with insufficient data. Though
an econometric model or quantification is not mandatory,' 44 it is quite difficult to imagine
how this standard can be met without one. In addition, there is widespread agreement that
4
carrying out an econometrics analysis for this condition is very difficult. s
In short, it seems the Appellate Body applied a strict standard for causation through its
standard of review that would prevent member countries from exercising their usual policy
discretion. Thus, it is recommended that the Appellate Body come up with a way to ensure
while guarding against its abuse member States can avail themselves of a safeguard measure
that complies with the SG Agreement when its domestic industry is embroiled in crises
situations. The optimal way to allow member states more discretion in investigating safeguard cases is to amend the SG Agreement to eliminate the ambiguity and conflicting
provisions that can be exploited by investigating authorities for protectionist ends. These
amendments would, undoubtedly, contribute to the transparency of the global trading rules,
reducing further opportunities for protectionist moves. But should political difficulties prevent such legislative action by member States, the second best approach is to expect the

138. Id.
139. Id.
140. U.S.-Line Pipe, supra note 86, para. 217. In U.S.-Line Pipe, the U.S. identified a number of other factors
that caused injury to the line pipe industry: decline in line pipe demand resulting from reduced oil and natural
gas drilling and production activities, competition, a decline in export markets in 1998 and interim 1999, a
shift from oil country tubular goods OCTG production to line pipe production, and a decline in raw material
costs. Rather that separating out the injurious effects of each of these factors from that of increased imports,
the United States merely analyzed the relative causal importance of these factors by determining whether any
factor is a more important cause of injury than increased imports.
141. Id.
142. Id. at para. 215.
143. U.S.-Steel, supra note 2.
144. Id.
145. See, e.g, Yang Guohua, Are Safeguard Measures Permitted Under the World Trade OrganizationSystem?,
17 TMp. Irr'I& Comp. LJ. 175 (2003).
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panels and Appellate Body to take a different stance towards the SG Agreement, as it did
in the past in Shrimp Turtle'46 and Asbestos' 4l by reinterpreting and relaxing the conditions
to meet article XX of GATT.4s These changes would impart safety valves to the WATO
system culminating in greater trade liberalization.
V. Conclusion
There are conflicting views about whether the safeguard measure was the correct remedy
to overcome the crisis in the U.S. steel industry. As elaborated in previous sections, the
U.S. steel industry, one of the most essential industries in the United States, was undergoing
difficult economic problems, while increased imports seemed to play a certain role in causing injury to the industry. It has always been and continuously will be a challenging policy
choice for the United States or any other nation to allow its basic industries to fall before
the principles of free trade. The history of the escape clause illustrates that it was for this
very purpose the clause was incorporated into the international trading regime under
GA'IT/WTO so that nations would be able to render temporary protection for its industry
while it adjusts to international competition. This in turn paved the way for successful global
trade liberalization during the past fifty years or so. For this reason, the United States had
the right to impose a safeguard measure to temporarily protect its industry from imports,
so as to give it breathing room to pursue adjustment. It appears the costly temporary protection paid off as the steel industry seemingly carried out adjustment to a certain degree.
However, notwithstanding the right to invoke a safeguard measure, the United States
fell short of imposing a measure that is in conformity with the WTO Agreement. To a
certain extent, inter alia, the causation standard crafted by the Appellate Body seems to be
the fundamental source of this non-compliance, as the standard as such appears to be more
restrictive than necessary and surpasses the level of practicality.
U.S.-Steel demonstrates that the international community, and in particular the United
States who recently experienced the catch-22 situation of firmly advocating the trade liberalization process and simultaneously protecting its strategic and politically sensitive industries, should be more sympathetic to the rights of other nations to render temporary
protection to sensitive industries. As one of the strongest advocates of trade liberalization,
the United States should learn from its own experiences and identify with the domestic
plights in developing countries when they are endeavoring to protect their vulnerable
industries.
Identifying the political sensitivities of different industries, taking into context the history,
economy, and culture of each country is of paramount importance. To ignore vulnerable
industries and homogenize them into a single economy, justifying it as a means for the
benefits of free trade is problematic. Although it is true that globalization was viewed, and

146. Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibitionof Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/
DS58/AB/R,(Oct. 12, 1998).
147. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-MeauresAffectingAsbestos andAsbestos-ContainingProducts, WT/DS135/AB/R, (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafterEC-Asbestos].
148. In the compliance panel, the WTO panel and Appellate Body held that the US measures were in
compliance with the WTO agreements. See U.S-Sbrimp Turtle, WT/DS58/RW, (June 15, 2001); WT/DS58/
AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001). In the EC-Asbestos, the WTO panel and Appellate Body accepted the EC's defense
to invoke article XX. See EC-Asbestos, supra note 147.
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still is by many countries with enormous optimism, times have changed.1 9 Many developing
countries have been encountering enormous economic distress due to liberalization, as
s
evidenced by the series of financial crises that hit varying parts of the world." Scholars
such as Joseph Stiglitz are voicing concerns that a blindfolded pursuit of trade liberalization,
without thinking about the internal redistributive effects of trade liberalization, warrants
careful reexamination.' Instead of merely passing judgment on arguably protectionist measures of other nations, while resorting to similar measures at home, efforts should be directed to lead the international trading system to take into account sensitive industries is
an important agenda.
In sum, the international community as a whole should try to come up with ways to take
into account politically sensitive areas of other countries, especially with regard to developing countries to pursue across-the-board liberalization. As part of such efforts, it is feasible to recreate a safeguard regime under the WVTO that may be less controversial and
may have less of a distorting impact on the rest of global trade so that it can be a viable
avenue for countries. A serious recommendation would be to incorporate a selective safeguard mechanism, which is closely coupled with other significant issues such as trade compensation. By doing so, the international community would be more at ease and sympathetic
because less of its trade interests would be affected by other nations' domestic problems.
The Doha Ministerial Declaration,' however, does not include the SG Agreement in its
agenda. In conclusion, incorporating the SG Agreement into the Doha agenda should be
reconsidered.

149. See Joseph Stighitz, We Have to Make Globalization Work for All, Reforms of the trade andfinancialsystems
are imperative, YALE GLOBAL, Oct. 17, 2003, at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id = 2637.
150. Id. at 2-3.

151. Id.
152. SeeWTO Ministerial Conference, Doha MinisterialDeclaration,WT/Min (01)/Dec/i (Nov. 20,2001),
available at http://www.wto.org.
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